In various letters written to Mersenne in 1640 and 1641, Descartes mentions the Summa philosophiae quadrapartita of Eustachius a Sancto Paulo. But nothing that he says would lead us to believe the work an important influence on his thought. Nonetheless, when we turn to the Summa we are immediately struck by what seem to be “Cartesian” elements in its presentation. For example, a distinction is drawn between formal logic and “natural” logic. Formal logic is seen as a convenience in learning (...) the sciences, but natural logic alone is found to be the absolutely essential requirement. And this natural logic is basically a product of the natural light. It is not difficult to see in these passages a foreshadowing of Descartes’ new conception of method. Like Eustachius, he too maintains that the natural functions of the mind are all that we require in the pursuit of truth. But we shall find even more interesting similarities between the two men. (shrink)

A careful examination of descartes' works shows that innate ideas are not born with the mind, But are generated by (i.E., Born within) the mind. This is descartes' way of talking about empirical concept formation, As well as what the mind can infer from these concepts. Particular examples are examined to provide the material and formal conditions for identifying innate ideas. Descartes forces the transition from medieval to very modern epistemology.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:482 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY G. E. Michalson, Jr. TheHistoricalDimensions ofaRattonalFaith. Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1977. Pp. 222. $8.65. The primary intentionof this work is to argue that historical or ecclesiastical religion plays a vital role in Kant's religious thought, because it is necessary to provide a sensible content for the purely formal doctrine of Kant's "moral" religion. But Michalson resists that this strategy cannot succeed, because of (...) the technical requirements of Kant's eplstmology, and that we must ultimately encounter an "impasse" in Kant's thought on history and religion (pp. 77, 134, 169). This is an area of Kant's thought that has not until recently received the attention it deserves. A careful consideration of all the related issued helps one to recognize, from perhaps the most beneficial standpoint, how all the various parts of Kant's philosophical scheme fit together. Michalson quite rightly maintains that we must remain within the epistemological framework Kant has established for the Critical Philosophy. But unfortunately he recognizes only the negative aspects of this framework. What he chooses to call "Kant's principle of human limitations" (mentioned thirtynine times) is the essential element in his interpretation. Secondly, Michalson is unwilling to follow the lead of other commentators (e.g., Michel Despland and Ylrmiahu Yovel) in broadening the context still further in order to take into account the full scope of Kant's philosophical project. These two defects persist throughout Michalson's analysis, and ultimately they prevent any fruitful conclusions. The approach employed, in its most simple form, ~sto point out that historical religion belongs to the phenomenal order and that morality (as the basis for Kant's technical rehgious position) belongs to the noumenal order. Kant's recognition of the need to bridge this gap is dealt with in terms of the "schematism of analogy" (pp. 95, 112-13) mentioned in Religion withinthe Ltmits ofReasonAlone. Michalson provides an interpretation of the schematism m Chapter 3 and concludes that "Kant's Religion is not altogether consistent with certain basic teachings of the critical philosophy" (p. 132). His attempt to deal with this problem carries him into a discussion of teleology and the highest good (Chapter 4), and it is only in this concluding chapter that his various interpretive errors crystallze and produce their Inevitable consequences. Rather than emphasizing the negative aspects of Kant's conception of man, Despland offers Kant's positive perspective on man and his destiny----drawing, for example, on the Anthropologyfrom a PragmaticPoint of View. Employing equally good judgment, Yovel provides an interpretation of the highest good which shows it as the culmination (in the indefinite future) of the concrete process through which man's social, political, educational, and religious development takes place. These perspectives permit the historical dimension (both religious and secular) to be gradually transformed by the imposition of moral designs--as men ~lowly and painfully assume responsibility for directing the blind laws of nature into patterns that serve moral ends. Such commentators help us to see more clearly what Kant was attempting to achieve and how the elements of his total philosophical scheme are to be understood as interconnected. Michalson, on the other hand, has only his impasse to offer us. Because history is phenomenal and religion (as morality) is noumenal, he maintainsthat no bridge is possible between the two realms. But this is simply a failure to recognize Kant's strategy. For Kant is very careful to restrict knowledge (in the strict sense) to the phenomenal order. But he is equally clear in asserting that it is legitimate (indeed, necessary) to postulate those conditions which alone make it possible for us to act in conformity with the moral law. Therefore, we must postulate not only God and immortality but the possibility of a worldly order which conforms both to the laws of nature and to the moral law. And for Kant these postulates have the full strength of rational truths, m that--like the postulates of mathematics -reason cannot reject them. Interpreting Kant's phenomenon-noumenon distinction strictly (but misapplying it), Michalson insists that such a projected ideal state of the world is inconsistent with Kant's epistemological commitment. For such... (shrink)

The essays that make up this volume are sufficiently different in content and scope that a title any less universal would be misleading. The topics discussed vary from aspects of Plato's thought in the Republic to specialized problems within the work of the later Wittgenstein. Each of the essays is interesting and worth reading, but it is unlikely that most readers will find them uniformly appealing.

This chapter explains the relationship between metaphysics and science as expounded by Descartes. The topic includes the effect of concepts of God and soul into the discovery of the scientific method. Metaphysical certainty grounds the rule of evidence in God, who is the source of all truth, and then extends from mathematics to everything so demonstrated in physics, and the knowledge that material things exist. The chapter examines in particular the stages of science's subordination to God, and some of its (...) consequences: What are the meaning and limits of the “fable” of The World? What is the difference between hypotheses, which move toward a conjunction with the real, and the “comparisons” employed in the Essays, which are not based on “principles”? Is the modern notion of a model ruled out, and with what legitimacy? (shrink)